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Abstract
This paper explores the similarity of the underlying economic problems that lead
to the establishment of (a) independent central banks to operate national monetary
policies and (b) independent regulatory agencies for telecommunications and other
utility service industries. We show that, in both cases, the adoption of agencies inde-
pendent of government results from the need to achieve credibility and a reputation
for economically sound long-run behaviour while preserving signi¯cant discretion to
handle unanticipated events. We show that this solution is superior to policy rules
that are ¯xed in advance. Both for central banks and regulatory agencies, what is re-
quired are institutions that provide limited and accountable discretion within a clear
policy framework, for example via high levels of accountability and transparency in
their decision making processes. On the basis of a review of the empirical literature,
we argue that central banks with superior governance arrangements, particularly on
accountability and transparency, out-perform those with inferior arrangements and
we discuss how this work might be extended to utility regulatory agencies.
JEL Classi¯cation: C72, E61,L51
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Over the last 10-20 years, there has been a enormous increase in the number of countries
(a) delegating monetary policy to independent central banks and (b) establishing separate
regulatory agencies for utility service industries - typically with telecommunications as
the path¯nder.1 This joint development has taken place not just in EU and other Eu-
ropean and OECD countries but also in many middle income countries (particularly in
Latin America) and increasingly in other developing countries, including some low income
countries in Asia and Africa.
The growth of these institutions has given rise to a sizeable number of academic and
informal discussion both of the central bank independence (its key characteristics, gov-
ernance issues and its impact) and of regulatory agencies (their key features including
independence and governance). However, to date, there has been little discussion of the
common relationship between the two developments. This is somewhat surprising since
the prime motive force behind the two developments is very similar - as we shall demon-
strate later. Indeed, one of the main purposes of this paper is precisely to demonstrate
the similarities in the underlying economic problem in each case and to show the common
relationship between the adopted responses.2
For independent central banks, there has been a lot of empirical work which suggests
that independent central banks - and particularly independent central banks with good
governance arrangements (and practices) - are associated with better macro-economic
outcomes, for example on in°ation and exchange rate volatilty. As yet, there is relatively
little literature that has formally tested the impact of independent utility regulation and
governance arrangements on utility service outcomes. This is, at least in part, because
of the di±culties in specifying common desirability in outcomes (for example, on utility
service price movements) across a large number of countries. Nevertheless, we will argue
that the empirical literature on the e®ects of various independent central bank governance
arrangements on macro-economic outcomes provides a strong starting point for evaluating
the impact of telecoms and other utility service regulators. This is the second objective
of the paper.
1See International Telecommunications Union (2002)
2An informal discussion of the policy issues is to be found in Stern and Trillas (2001).
1The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
rationale behind central bank independence. Section 3 discusses the empirical literature on
the impact of central bank independence and governance arrangements. Section 4 parallels
section 2 and presents the theoretical rationale behind the establishment of independent
regulatory agencies for utility services. Section 5 discusses the limited empirical literature
on the impact of independent regulators and governance arrangements. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 Rules and Delegation in the Conduct of Monetary Policy
2.1 The Monetary Policy Game
It is useful to distinguish between three types of problems facing central banks, regulators
and other public authorities: (i) the credibility of commitment; (ii) asymmetric infor-
mation in relation to the private sector; (iii) non-benevolence arising, for example, from
electoral pressures or capture by special interest groups. In this paper we focus almost
exclusively on the ¯rst of these problems and we assume that the policymaker in question
is benevolent and shares information with the private sector (and vice-versa). Although
we do not formalize games with asymmetric information3 and political economy consider-
ations4 at this stage, we discuss these aspects in the broader discussion that follows.
Following the seminal article by Barro and Gordon (1983) the credibility problem
involving the conduct of monetary policy is usually formalised in the literature in terms
of a game between the private sector and the Central Bank (CB). Until we introduce
delegation, the CB is not independent and its preferences are those of the government.
The elements of this game are as follows. The private sector consists of consumers, ¯rms
and wage setters. There are large numbers of these agents so the private sector is atomistic
and does not act strategically. For the purposes of the game their behaviour is completely
described by the an expectations-augmented Phillips Curve (EAPC)
lt = ¹ l + »[¼ ¡ Et¡1(¼t)] ¡ ²t (1)
3In relation to asymmetric information, Geraats (2001) provides a comprehensive review of the theo-
retical literature on the bene¯ts or otherwise of central bank transparency.
4But see al-Nowaihi and Levine (1998), for a recent treatment of political monetary cycles.
2where lt denotes employment in period t expressed in logarithms, ¹ l is the equilibrium
or `natural' level of employment, ¼t is the in°ation rate, Et(¢) denotes expectations at
time t and ²t is a supply shock with known mean and standard deviation. In what
follows we will assume that shocks are independently distributed over time with zero
mean. Thus employment stays an a constant equilibrium level unless an in°ation surprise
or supply shock occurs in period t. The EAPC then constitutes the economic environment
or constraint facing the CB given the expectations of in°ation.
In the monetary policy game, the move of the CB is the in°ation rate set in each
period.5 The CB objective is to achieve price stability, ie zero in°ation, but is also aware
that monetary policy has real e®ects in the short-term and can therefore increase employ-
ment above its equilibrium level. All policymakers including the CB would prefer full-
employment to unemployment and zero in°ation to positive or negative in°ation. If n is
the full-employment level (still in logarithms and assuming a ¯xed individual supply of
labour by households) then the unemployment rate in equilibrium (the `natural rate' or
`NAIRU') is approximately n ¡ ¹ l = u, say. In employment- in°ation space the bliss point
of the CB is then (n;0). These preferences can be captured by the single-period social
welfare function
Wt = b(lt ¡ n)2 + ¼2 (2)
The remaining ingredient in the game is the model of expectations. Before the `Rational
Expectations' revolution, for instance in the work of Milton Friedman who introduced
the EAPC into macroeconomics, the usual scheme was the adaptive expectations rule
in which case the credibility problem described below does not arise. The credibility or
`time-inconsistency' problem, ¯rst raised by Kydland and Prescott (1977), only emerges
with rational expectations. In game-theoretic terms without asymmetric information, this
amounts to assuming complete information; i.e., the private sector knows the exact nature
of the CB's calculations and uses this knowledge to form its expectations.
5Of course CB's do not in fact `set' in°ation; but we can think of them as having intermediate in°ation
targets which they successfully achieve using the usual array of actual monetary instruments (the money
supply, short-term interest rates, reserve ratios etc). What is important is that the actual targets are
credible in the sense to be described below.
32.2 Commitment and The Time-Inconsistency Problem
First suppose that the CB commits to an in°ation rule. For the simple, essentially static
model of the economy assumed, the optimal commitment rule must take the form of
a constant deterministic component plus a stochastic shock-contingent component; i.e.,
¼t =¹ ¼ + ¹²t with ¹ ¼ and ¹ yet to be determined.
The sequence of moves is:
1. The CB commits itself at the beginning of time t=0 to apply the rule to all future
periods t=1,2,..
2. In period t-1, the private sector forms an expectation.
3. In period t, the CB observes the shock ²t and implements the rule ¼t =¹ ¼ + ¹².
Since there are no structural dynamics in this setup, the CB's optimization problem
is to minimise the expected welfare loss given the EAPC, the sequence of events and the
rational expectations assumption. From the latter the CB can put Et¡1(¼t)=¹ ¼. Hence
from the EAPC (1) and the welfare loss function (2) we can substitute ¼t =¹ ¼ + ¹² to
obtain
E0[Wt]=¹ ¼2 + bu2 +[ ¹2 + b(1 ¡ »¹)2]¾2 (3)
where u = n¡¹ l is the equilibrium rate of unemployment (in logarithms) and ¾2 = var(²).
Minimising (3) with respect to ¹ ¼ and ¹ leads to the result
¹ ¼ =0 ¹ =
b»
1+b»2 (4)




Thus the optimal in°ation rule with commitment then consists of zero average in°ation
plus a shock-contingent component which sees in°ation raised (ie monetary policy relaxed)
in the face of a negative supply shock.
Although the commitment solution is optimal ex ante at stage 1 of the game, it ceases
to be optimal ex post at stage 3 when the rule is to be implemented. If the CB were to re-
optimize at this stage, then it would take expectations Et¡1(¼t) = 0 as given. Observing
the shock it would then choose the in°ation rate to minimize
Wt = ¼2
t + b(u + »¼t ¡ ²t)2 (6)
4leading to a revised higher in°ation rate
¼t =
b»
1+b»2(u + ²t) (7)
If no mechanism exists to enforce commitment then the rational private sector will an-
ticipate this act of reneging and the ex ante optimal rule with zero average in°ation will
lack credibility. There is, in other words, a `time inconsistency' problem in that: even
benevolent CBs always have an incentive to have a short-term monetary expansion to
boost economic growth, and market participants know that CBs have such an incentive so
that they will discount their statements on the need for a stable anti-in°ationary policy,
however strongly made. The only credible rule must now be consistent with discretion or,
in other words, period-by-period optimization by the CB.
2.3 Discretion
With discretionary policy the sequence of events is now:
1. In period t-1, the private sector forms an expectation.
2. In period t, the CB observes the shock ²t and chooses the in°ation rate .
To solve this game we must proceed by backwards induction and start at stage 2.
Given expectations Et¡1(¼t)=¼e
t say, the welfare loss (2) can be written
Wt = ¼2
t + b[»(¼t ¡ ¼e
t) ¡ u ¡ ²t]2 (8)




t + u + ²t] (9)
Proceeding to stage 1 the private sector uses (9) to form the rational expectation
Et¡1(¼t)=b»u (10)
Hence the discretionary policy takes the form
¼t = b»u +
b»
1+b»2²t (11)
The policy described by (11) can in fact be implemented as a rule with the same state-
continent component as the ex ante optimal rule. The di®erence is now that it includes a
non-zero average in°ation or in°ationary bias equal to b»u which renders the rule time-
consistent. The credibility problem can be stated simply as how to eliminate the in°a-
tionary bias whilst retaining the °exibility to deal with exogenous shocks.
52.4 Rogo® Delegation: A Second-Best Solution to the Credibility Prob-
lem
Originally monetary growth rules were seen as the most likely way of handling the macroe-
conomic time inconsistency problem. (See Friedman (1968)) However, rules are di±cult
to apply strictly and their performance has been increasingly disappointing for many rea-
sons. Consider, for example, the informational requirements needed to design the optimal
rule. In our simple set-up the only source of uncertainty is the exogenous supply shock ²t
which we assumed to be independently distributed over time with zero mean and known
standard deviation. This assumption is not too restrictive. If we allow serial correlation
and a non-zero mean then the optimal in°ation rule is as before with the innovation,
¼t ¡ Et¡1[¼t] replacing ²t.
More serious is allowing for other forms of uncertainty, the most obvious of which is
model uncertainty associated with the slope of the EAPC and consequently the parameter
»t, which now becomes a stochastic time series. The optimal commitment rule (5) is a
feedback on current observations or estimates of the supply shock ²t. In general optimal
rules under uncertainty do not have this convenient `certainty equivalence' property and
depend on higher moments of the distribution describing the stochastic parameters. To
design a commitment rule with stochastic »t and ²t, the policymaker needs to know the
joint distribution of »t and ²t. In a more realistic model of the transmission mechanism
between in°ation and output, more potential model uncertainty emerges. In practice then
optimal commitment rules are exceedingly di±cult to design. Inevitably it is impossible
to incorporate every aspect of model uncertainty so any rule must be sub-optimal. This
feature of optimal rules has been understood by macro-economists for some time and
attention has focused on `simple' sub-optimal feedback rules, such as the Taylor Rule,
which feed back on a limited number of easily observed macro-economic variables, such as
nominal income or in°ation.6 However even simple commitment rules have the drawback
that any revisions to their precise form arising from new information about the economy
will be di±cult to distinguish from reneging on a previous commitment.
The alternative and, increasingly, the preferred solution to the macroeconomic time
inconsistency problem has been for governments to delegate the operation of monetary
6See Levine and Currie (1985), Currie and Levine(1993).
6policy to a goal-independent central bank with powers of discretion. In the context of our
model goal-independence means that the CB sets and perfectly achieves its own in°ation
rate in accordance with its own welfare loss function. The theoretical case for such a
policy has been set out by Rogo® (1985) among others. Rogo® proposed a second-best
solution to the credibility problem involving a trade-o® between low average in°ation and
e®ective monetary stabilization policy. The solution is to delegate monetary policy to
an independent central bank with an appointed board chosen to be `conservative', in the
sense that they assign a higher priority to low in°ation than that of the representative
government. An optimal choice of conservatism will then see bankers appointed who
deliver low average in°ation, but who are not so over-conservative as to prevent monetary
stabilization.
The details of the delegation equilibrium are as follows: suppose that both the govern-
ment and the appointed bankers have preferences represented by the welfare loss function
of the form (2), but with a di®erent weight on employment. For the government a weight
b = bm is adopted representing the preferences of the median voter. The point of delega-
tion is that the bankers have di®erent preferences, b 6= bm.7 One would expect bankers to
be naturally conservative in which case their weight on employment b is less than bm. Some
bankers are more conservative than others and, in principle, by asking potential appointees
how much higher in°ation is worth sacri¯cing for a 1% reduction in unemployment, the
government can employ a CB executive with a particular degree of conservatism. In what
follows we assume the government does this in such a way as to minimise its own welfare
loss function. The CB is subsequently goal and instrument-independent, and pursues a
discretionary policy corresponding to its own preferences.
The sequence of events in this `delegation game' is as follows:
1. The degree of independence of the CB or the type of banker is chosen by the government
determining the weight b for subsequent periods t=0,1,2..
2. In period t-1 the private sector forms an expectation .
3. In period t the CB observes the shock ²t and chooses the in°ation rate ¼t.
Solving the game by backward induction as before, at stage 1 the credible in°ation rule
is given by (11) where we stress that the weight b now refers to the preferences of the CB,
7In fact Rogo® got the idea of delegating to conservative bankers from his experience working at the
US Fed.
7not the government. The latter has preferences formalised by the welfare loss function:
Wt = bm(lt ¡ n)2 + ¼2
t = bm[»(¼t ¡ ¼e
t) ¡ ²t ¡ u]2 + ¼2
t (12)
using the EAPC as before. Substituting for the in°ation rule of the CB, (11), and taking
expectations we the have







which the government minimises with respect to b.
The ¯rst order condition for a minimum is
bu2 + ¾2 (b ¡ bm)
(1 + b»2)3 (14)
Since the ¯rst term on the left-hand-side of (14) is positive, the second term must be
negative; i.e., b<b m so that the optimally chosen banker is conservative8. It is also
apparent that if then b>0 so that the optimal conservative banker does not completely
eliminate the in°ationary bias but, instead, achieves a compromise of a lower in°ation rate
than the representative banker and the retention of some degree of stabilization policy.9
Figure 1 illustrates Rogo®-delegation by plotting the expected welfare loss as given
by (13) against the parameter b, for di®erent values of ¾.10 The optimal choice of b, the
inverse of the degree of conservatism, is at the minimum point of these graphs and these
con¯rm that optimal b lies between 0 and bm =1 . A s¾ increases, the need to delegate
to bankers who engage in more stabilization emerges and this optimal choice then shifts
closer to bm.
The great advantage of delegation is that, in contrast with commitment rules of either
the optimal or sub-optimal variety, the CB retains discretionary powers and can base
monetary policy on the latest forecasts and information available. To explore this further,
suppose now we allow » and u to vary over time. Given expectations of in°ation on the
8The ¯rst-order condition (14) is a quartic in b so there may be more than one choice of conservatism
satisfying this equation. In fact it is straightforward to show that there is only one positive solution to
(14).
9Lohmann (1992) shows how this compromise can be improved, with a more favourable welfare outcome,
using a rule with an escape clause specifying zero in°ation for small supply shocks and discretionary
behaviour with stabilization for large shocks.
10Parameter values are » = bm = 1 and u =0 :05.




















Figure 1: Rogo®-Delegation of Monetary Policy





(ut + »tEt¡1[¼t]+²t] (15)
based on their best current estimates of »t, ut and ²t. Optimal delegation described above
in the ¯rst-stage of the delegation game still requires knowledge of the joint distribution of
all parameter describing the model. It must also take into account rational expectations
formed using (15) which now incorporates uncertainty in parameters »t and ut. Delegation
will inevitably be sub-optimal even if the right CB types can be found.11
There are a number of problems with Rogo®'s solution at both theoretical and practical
11An alternative interpretation of choosing b<b m is that it represents the degree of central bank
independence. A completely independent bank would eliminate the in°uence of the government over
monetary policy. Then assuming that bankers are naturally very conservative the result would be a choice
of the weight b close to zero. At the other extreme a low degree of independence would result in the
CB adopting a weight on employment close to bm. The choice of b between these extreme is then one of
choosing an institutional structure for the CB which allows for a particular degree of government in°uence
over the conduct of monetary policy. The same (in fact greater) practical problems arise in the choice of
b with this interpretation.
9levels. The fundamental theoretical problem is that the solution is predicated on the
assumption that commitment to the type of banker or degree of independence is possible
whereas commitment to a monetary rule is not. The public must be reassured that once
their expectations of in°ation are formed, the government will not sack or over-rule the
banker and appoint a less conservative banker or in°ation target. Another theoretical
problem is that when open-economy aspects and ¯scal interactions are introduced the
delegation equilibrium may turn out to exhibit signi¯cant Nash ine±ciencies.12
At a practical level the government has to ¯nd a central banker with the right weight
b. However, for a typical OECD country one can think of the monetary framework in
two ways: as literal or `as if' Rogo® Delegation. In the case of literal delegation a goal-
independent CB has evolved towards optimally conservative bankers. This may possibly
involve reputation-building where reputation for independence is established over time.
In the case of 'as if' Rogo® an independent CB that has a duty to act in a conservative
way (e.g. via obligations set out in the relevant law). The CB is goal dependent, in the
sense that its objectives (in the form of utility de¯ned over outcomes) are given to it
by policymakers. However, the CB has the legal right to set the instruments under its
control in a discretionary manner, using all available current information. The US Federal
reserve with its emphasis on the personality of its head corresponds more to literal Rogo®-
delegation and the European Central Bank (ECB) is a good example of `as if' delegation.
The Bank of England (BoE) is goal-dependent with imposed in°ation targets which can
be revised by government. Then the UK monetary policy could be seen as a form of `as
if' Rogo® delegation. However, the ECB has a higher degree of discretion than the BoE.
In a uncertain world where the economic environment is constantly changing one might
expect either of these forms of policy regime to outperform any ¯xed rule that forbids
discretion. In addition `as if' Rogo® delegation might be expected to be superior to pure
Rogo® delegation since the policy depends less on whether the predicted performance of
monetary policy decision-makers is optimally conservative. With `as if' Rogo® delegation
where the desired trade-o® between low in°ation and °exibility is given to the o±ce-holder
as a duty that they must ful¯l, the choice of monetary policy decision-maker can be made
purely on the basis of technical and other ability and not on ability plus a prediction of
12See Currie et al (1996) and Levine and Pearlman (2001)
10whether the chosen person is (and will remain) optimally conservative.
To summarise then the choice of approach to the credibility problem is then between the
second-best alternatives of commitment to a sub-optimal commitment rule either ¯xed and
based only on information on the economy available at the time the rule is announced, or
state-contingent but in a very limited and transparent way; or delegation to an independent
CB who follows a sub-optimal discretionary policy based on all the latest information on
the economy.
3 The Impact of Independent Central Banks
There is a very large literature on the economic impact of central bank independence.13
The general consensus is that countries which assign monetary policy to an independent
central bank have lower and less variable rates of in°ation. There is less evidence that
countries with independent central banks have higher employment levels or that they
have less variance - i.e., that they avoid `boom and bust' as claimed by Gordon Brown.
If countries with independent central banks have less variable in°ation, their real interest
rates should be lower and this should encourage investment and increase the rate of growth
for a long period if not in perpetuity. But again, there is less conclusive evidence on this.
The real di±culty with assessing the impact of independent central banks is that
choosing to have an independent central bank is related to countries' macroeconomic
policies. For instance, in 1948, Germany established a highly independent central bank,
which was given extensive control of monetary policy and a strong anti-in°ation objective.
But, all the evidence is that, as a result of its history, post-1945 Germany was a highly
in°ation averse country and that the political choice for a highly independent central
bank was in response to this in°ation aversion. Similarly, the UK only made the Bank
of England independent and established the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to set
interest rates after a decade or more of low in°ation and when all major political parties
had become convinced that a low in°ation environment was essential for good economic
performance.
In consequence, as has been recognized by others, the statistical association between
assigning monetary policy to an independent central bank and low in°ation may or may
13Excellent surveys are to be found in E±nger and De Haan (1996) and Walsh (1998), chapter 11.
11not be causal. It may partially or wholly re°ect the fact that countries which are more
in°ation averse or which place more weight on having a sound economic policy choose
to have an independent central bank. There is some evidence that this is the case, as
countries with healthy economies, not surprisingly, ¯nd it easier to establish independent
central banks - and much easier to sustain them.
Many of the indicators used to assess the degree of independence of central banks in
controlling monetary policy are the same as those used to assess the degree of independence
of telecom and other utility regulatory agencies. This is particularly true for measures of
political independence. For instance, both literatures agree on the importance of issues
such as:
² Procedures for appointment and, more importantly, for the dismissal of governors;
² The existence of ¯xed terms of o±ce;
² Government's rights to give instructions to the agency;
² Rights to veto, suspend or defer the agencies' decisions; and
² Governments' rights to have agency board members.
These indicators are typically taken as measures of political independence and are usu-
ally measured from provisions in the relevant law. They are thus examples of formal, legal
aspects of governance. In addition, some attention has been given to actual independence
as measured, for example, by the turnover rate of central bank governors or the proportion
of governors replaced within 6 months of a change of regime or a change of government.
This can give signi¯cantly di®erent results than those obtained from what is written in
the relevant laws. In general, formally independent central bank governors in developing
countries are more likely to have high departure rates following a change of government
or regime. Argentina is a case in point.
The key problem in testing for the e®ect of individual components on in°ation and
other is that they are highly related - countries which give ¯xed terms for bank governors
are also likely not to require government approval of monetary policy decisions. The so-
lution adopted by researchers is therefore to combine governance elements either (a) into,
for example, a number of types of central bank with similar characteristics or (b) into a
continuous index. Both methods suggest higher central bank independence is associated
with lower in°ation, but the literature has not yet identi¯ed which variables are most im-
12portant. Indices are probably the better solution but they do have problems, for example,
the weighting of di®erent categories are often arbitrarily weighted equally and some very
di®erent institutional features in di®erent countries can actually have similar indices.
4 Price Regulation and the Under-investment Problem
4.1 The Legal Context and the Under-Investment Problem
Explicit regulation of telecommunications and other utility services by designated and
independent regulatory agencies was originally developed in the US. The FCC (Federal
Communications Commission) was established in 1934. It is no co-incidence that regu-
lation developed ¯rst in the US since telephone and other utility service providers were
more likely to be privately owned and managed there than in other countries.
US regulation originally developed to protect the rights of consumers facing a vertically
and horizontally integrated monopoly utility like the Bell System. However, it was also
realised that protecting the consumers in the medium to long run meant that utilities -
particularly privately owned companies - had to be able to earn a reasonable rate of return
on their investments. In particular, the companies had to have the regulatory guarantees
to be able to ¯nance the large network and other investments required to roll out the
system and create an e±cient, nation-wide telephone system. These considerations led to
the concept of \just and reasonable rates" being placed at the heart of the US regulatory
system.
The establishment of an independent regulator has been a major element in the pri-
vatisation process. A regulator with clearly de¯ned powers and duties is seen around the
world as providing protection for the new shareholders in a way that no Government can
guarantee. Oftel was the ¯rst UK regulator, established in 1984, following the Littlechild
report in 1983, and its establishment was clearly part of the privatisation package. Other
independent regulatory o±ces were set up in the UK for gas, electricity, water and railways
as they were privatised.
Oftel was installed to protect consumers in the face of a privately owned highly dom-
inant supplier (BT) facing very limited competition. It was also, however, installed to
protect the company and investors in it, many of whom were ¯rst-time shareholders. As
13telecom competition developed, Oftel increasingly had a role in protecting the interests of
shareholders in the new entrants.
However, underlining this protection of shareholders was the notion that the main
objective of regulation was to protect the interests of consumers - short and long-term.
Indeed, this has been explicitly written into the Utilities Act 2000 for electricity and gas
regulation in the UK where the principal duty of the regulatory agency was speci¯ed as
\to protect the interests of consumers wherever appropriate by promoting competition".14
It should be stressed here that consumers are de¯ned in the Act as \both existing and
future consumers". This means that sustainability of economic arrangements is crucial
and the protection of investors is essential to achieve the necessary investment in privately
owned telecom and other utilities.
The UK (and most other) regulatory laws which specify such regulatory duties will
normally de¯ne consumers' interests in this way rather than just the interests of current
consumers speci¯cally to exclude the temptation of short-term consumer oriented pop-
ulism. This is a classic time inconsistency problem analagous to the in°ationary bias
problem in monetary policy; for utility services like telecoms is that they require large
volumes of investment which, once installed become `sunk assets' in the sense that most
or all of them cannot be removed and used elsewhere or sold on second-hand markets.
In consequence, private investors are at risk of opportunistic behaviour by Governments,
particularly over prices, once the investments have been installed; and awareness by pri-
vate investors of this regulatory risk drives up the required rate of return and the cost of
capital. The latter dramatically reduces investment as has been seen in many countries.
(see Levy and Spiller, 1996).
4.2 The Model
In order to examine the under-investment or `hold-up' problem, we now set out below
a simple model of the regulatory pricing problem for private sector utility services such
as telecoms. We will show that there exists a close parallel between the in°ation bias in
the conduct of monetary policy and a high price bias arising from the under-investment
14It is extremely likely that an identical or extremely similar form of words will be used in the new UK
act to replace Oftel (and the ITC) with OFCOM which will handle all telecom and broadcasting regulation
in the UK.
14problem in utility regulation.
There are two periods. In period t =1 ;2, the ¯rm produces a quantity qt of a homo-
geneous good at total cost
Ct = ¯t + ctqt; ¯1 = k1 + i; ¯2 = k2 ¡ f(i) (16)
where ct and kt are stochastic time-varying marginal and ¯xed costs respectively in the
period t in the absence of investment, i is monetary investment in period 1 which leads to
a lowering of ¯xed cost of f(i) in period 2. We make standard assumptions: f0 > 0;f00 < 0
and f0(0) = 1 . The good is sold at a price pt = Ã(qt) where Ã(¢) is the inverse demand
curve.
In period 1 with the regulated price p1 and therefore quantity q1 = Ã¡1(p1) prede-
termined. Our focus is on the investment decision in period 1 and the price decision in
period 2. The ¯rm invests to lower ¯xed costs in period 2. The ¯rm is risk neutral and in
period 1, given p2 it maximizes expected discounted period pro¯ts over the two periods.
Pro¯ts in periods t =1 ;2, are given by
U1(p1;i)=p1q1 ¡ C1 =( p1 ¡ c1)Ã¡1(p1) ¡ k1 ¡ i (17)
U2(p2;i)=p2q2 ¡ C2 =( p2 ¡ c2)Ã¡1(p2) ¡ k2 + f(i) (18)
In period t the government's social welfare function is given by
Wt(pt;i)=S(pt)+®mUt(pt;i) t =1 ;2 (19)





but, by analogy with Rogo®-delegation, the government may delegate the choice of price
to an independent regulator with preferences
Wt(pt;i)=S(pt)+®Ut(pt;i);t =1 ;2 (21)
where ® 6= ®m. As for the monetary policy game, ®m represents the preferences of the
median voter. If ®>® m, the regulator is `pro-¯rm' and this is analagous to the `conser-
vative' central banker. Whatever the regulator type, she faces a participation constraint
U2(p2;i) ¸ 0.
154.3 Regulation with Commitment
The sequence of moves in the case of commitment is given by:
1. In period 1 the regulator commits to a price rule for period 2.
2. In period 1 the ¯rm chooses investment.
3. In period 2 the investment project is realized and then the regulator implements the
rule.
Expected two-period investment plus ¯xed costs are k1 + i + E1[±(k2 ¡ f(i))] which
is minimised at a ¯rst-best (FB) investment i = iFB > 0 satisfying 1 = ±f0(i).15 The
¯rm, however, can choose not to invest. If the ¯rm can exit from the industry in period 2,
or the regulator guarantees a non-zero pro¯t in period 2 whatever the investment choice,
then the second period pro¯t must satisfy U2(p2;0) ¸ 0. Assume for the moment that the
commitment price is such that this constraint binds. Then the ¯rm will choose i = iFB in
preference to i = 0 i® at stage 2
i · E1[±U2(p2;i)] = ±E1[(p2 ¡ c2)Ã¡1(p2) ¡ k2 + f(iFB)] (22)
Therefore at stage 1 the ex ante optimal price rule contingent on estimates of c2 and k2
in period 1 that induces optimal investment is
(p2 ¡ E1[c2])Ã¡1(p2)=E1[k2] ¡ f(iFB)+±¡1iFB (23)
at p2 = pC, say (C for commitment). The rule (23) is announced by the regulator at stage
1 of the game. The left-hand-side of (23) is upward-sloping in p2.16 Therefore it intersects
with the constant right-hand-side at a unique price that is just su±cient to induce the ¯rm
to invest at the ¯rst-best level. The ¯xed variant of the rule is conditional on estimates of
c2, k2 available at the time the commitment is made in the ¯rst period. However as for the
monetary rule in the state-contingent variant, these can also be realizations or improved
estimates in period 2, providing the basis for such revisions is completely transparent.
Notice that the rule o®ers a guaranteed rate of return equal to ±¡1 ¡1=r where r is the
¯rm's discount rate.
15Et[¢] denotes rational expectations as before. Note that both i
FB > 0 and ±f(i
FB) >i
FB are ensured
by the assumed properties of f(¢)
16To see this di®erentiate to obtain
d
dp2[(p2 ¡ c2)q2]=1¡ ´L(p2) where L =
p2¡c2
p2 is the Lerner index
and ´ = ¡
p2dq2
q2dp2 is the elasticity of demand. Since L<
1
´, the monopoly case, the result follows.
16The time-consistency problem is now apparent. Whereas (23) is optimal ex ante,
ex post in period 2 there is an incentive for the regulator, who considers investment as
bygones, to revise the price downwards to a level that will just satisfy the participation
constraint U2(p2;i FB); i.e., based on observations of c2 and k2 to p2 satisfying
(p2 ¡ c2)Ã¡1(p2)=k2 ¡ f(iFB) (24)
at p2 = pR, say (R for `reneging'). This incentive, which exists even if prior estimates of
c2 and k2 were correct, depends on the regulator not being too `pro-¯rm' as captured by
the parameter ®m in (19). As shown below in the delegation game this incentive certainly
exists for a utilitarian regulator with ®m = 1 and more so for a `pro-consumer' regulator
with ®m < 1. Let us assume that ®m · 1. As for monetary policy, if no mechanism
exists to enforce commitment then the ¯rm anticipates this act of reneging and the ex
ante optimal price rule will lack credibility. The only credible rule must then be consistent
with discretion or, in other words, period-by-period optimization by the regulator.
4.4 Price Regulation with Discretion
The sequence of moves in the case of discretion is given by:
1. In period 1 the ¯rm chooses investment.
2. In period 2 the investment project is realized and then the regulator observes c2 and
k2 and sets the price subject to a participation constraint U2(p2;i) ¸ 0.
The solution is straightforward. The ¯rm now has no incentive to invest so i =0 .I n
period 2 the regulator sets the price so that U2(p2;0) = 0; i.e.,
(p2 ¡ c2)Ã¡1(p2)=k2 ¡ f(0) = k2 (25)
at p2 = pD, say. Since f(iFB) >± ¡1iFB we have that pR <p C <p D.17 Figure 2 illustrates
this result. Thus paradoxically the consumer loses out as a result of the opportunistic
behaviour of the regulator who is not su±ciently `anti-consumer' in her preferences ®m · 1.
Because of the opportunity to renege and lower the price to p2 = pR, the equilibrium that
results sees no investment and p2 = pD >p C. This is analogous to the monetary policy
case where because of the incentive to renege on zero in°ation and raise output by engaging
17Hence U(p
C;0) < 0 con¯rming that U(p2;0) ¸ 0 is a binding constraint which we assumed in (22).
17in surprise in°ation, the public ends up in a discretionary equilibrium with high in°ation
and output still at its equilibrium level.
Figure 2: The Underinvestment Problem
.
Notes : AA0 = p2Ã¡1(p2 ¡ c2) = LHS of (24) and (25)
OC = E1[k2] ¡ f(iFB)+±¡1iFB
OR = k2 ¡ f(iFB)
OD = k2 ¡ f(0) = k2
4.5 Rogo®-Delegation to an Independent Regulator
In the model as it stands there is under-investment unless the government is able to
commit to a price rule before investment is made that guarantees a su±cient return to
the ¯rm. The practical implementation problems with this rule are similar to those of the
monetary rule: more complex and realistic models of the ¯rm will lead to non-certainty
18equivalence and rules which depend on second moments and the joint distribution of ct and
kt. Revisions of the rule will be indistinguishable from reneging unless the basis for these
revisions are completely transparent. For instance the ¯rm may have private information
regarding costs. Then any commitment mechanism in place will lack credibility and the
¯rm may still under-invest.
If the main purpose of independent central banks is to eliminate the temptation to
engage in surprise in°ation, the main purpose of independent regulatory agencies is to
solve the hold-up problem and eliminate the temptation to engage in a surprise cut in
the regulated price, thereby supporting investment. Of course, this has to be done while
protecting the legitimate interests of shareholders and consumers. But, in itself, protect-
ing the rights of investors reduces investment risk premia and the cost of capital and
hence further reduces the costs of investment to the utilities and thereby lowers prices to
consumers.
As set out above, the underlying rationale for an independent utilities regulator and
an independent central bank is extremely similar. This suggests that there may well
be similarities between the proposed ways of creating an institution which can establish
and maintain a credible reputation for making and keeping commitments in a way that
governments ¯nd extremely di±cult to do. Surprisingly, however, there has been relatively
little written on the Rogo®-delegation approach in regulation.18
We now turn to the formalisation of the delegation game in regulation. As for dis-
cretion we con¯ne ourselves to the case where c2 and k2 are observed in period 2 by the
regulator and there is no asymmetric information.19 The timing of events is as follows:
1. The ¯rm government delegates price regulation to an independent regulator with ob-
jective function:
S(p2)+®U2(p2;i) (26)
18Rogo®-delegation has been proposed in the environmental regulation context by Spulber and Besanko
(1992). Where ¯rms have private information, Currie, Levine and Rickman (1998) examine the role of
delegation as a means of ameliorating the `ratchet-e®ect' associated with incentive contracts. Levine and
Rickman (2001) extend this study to include the hold-up problem. Levine and Trillas (2001) address the
under-investment problem and compare Rogo®-delegation with a model of lobbying. The treatment of this
section largely follows Levine and Trillas (2001).
19Asymmetric information requires incentive mechanisms to make the ¯rm reveal its type; see, for
example, Levine and Rickman (2001).
19in period 2, where ® ¸ 1 measures the extent to which the regulator is pro-industry.
2. The ¯rm chooses investment i.
3. At the beginning of period 2, the regulator observes c2 and k2 and chooses p2 to
maximize (26).
Solving by backward induction for a perfect equilibrium, at stage 3 the independent
regulator solves the problem:
Given i maximize w:r:tp 2 [S(p2)+®U2(p2;i)] (27)
subject to U2(p2;i)=( p2 ¡ c2)q2 ¡ k2 + f(i) ¸ 0.





®(´ ¡ 1 )+1
= pL
2(®) (28)
if the second-period participation constraint does not bind (i.e., U2(pL
2;i) > 0). It should be
noted that pL
2 is independent of investment. If the constraint does bind then the regulated
price is a function of investment p2 = p2(i) where p2(i) is the solution to U2(p2(i);i)=
0. Note that p2(0) = pD the discretionary price level following no investment set by a
government-dependent regulator.
Given a particular realization of c2 and k2 the participation constraint binds for low
®. Clearly U2(pL
2;i) < 0i f® = 1 (in which case pL
2 = c2), the case of a representative
regulator. But as ® increases, eventually the Lerner price given by (28) reaches a threshold
value to yield expected non-negative rent given by ® =^ ®(i) > 1 for which E1[pL
2(^ ®)=





where we de¯ne the Lerner index, L =
E1[p2¡c2]
E1[p2] in terms of expected outcomes. Since
L 2 [0; 1
´] it follows that ^ ® 2 [1;1).
Given this choice of price at stage 3, at stage 2 if the participation constraint binds in
period 2 and E1[U2(p2(i);i)] = 0 for a given investment, then the ¯rm does not invest in
period 1. When ®>^ ®(i) the expected constraint ceases to bind and the expected price
E1[p2]=E1[pL
2] where pL
2 is given by (28). This increases with ®, which increases the rent.
Now an incentive to invest may exist. If the ¯rm does choose to invest it will achieve a
20maximum of the 2-period rents
(p1 ¡ c1)Ã¡1(p1) ¡ k1 ¡ i + ±E1[(pL
2 ¡ c2)Ã¡1(pL
2) ¡ k2 ¡ f(i)] (30)
at i = iFB > 0 (the ¯rst-best) satisfying
1=±f0(i) (31)
However the ¯rm may also choose not to invest. Given the regulated second-period price,
i = iFB is preferable to i = 0 only if the ¯rm expects the regulated price pL
2 to be
su±ciently high to ensure that
±E1[U2(pL
2(®);i FB) ¡ U2(pL
2(®);0)] ¡ iFB > 0 (32)
subject to E1[U2(pL
2(®);0)] ¸ 0, the expected second-period participation constraint
following no investment. If at higher values of ®, this constraint does not bind then (32)
becomes simply ±f(iFB) >i FB which always holds. If the constraint does bind (32)
becomes:
±E1[U2(pL
2(®);i FB)] ¡ iFB > 0 (33)
This occurs when ®>®, say. The evaluation of ¹ ® and ^ ® requires the probability distri-
bution of c2 (but not that of k2).
Figures 3 and 4 provide some numerical solutions of the delegation equilibrium for
the functional form and particular parameter values shown.20 In ¯gure 3, for ®<¹ ®,
investment and rent are zero and the price is given by p¤
2 = p2(0) >p 2(iFB). For ® 2
[^ ®(iFB); ¹ ®], investment is still zero, but p2 rises until at ® = bar® the rent in period
2 is just su±cient to satisfy condition (32) and induce the optimal level of investment.
If ® increases further to a value high enough such that pL
2(®) >p 2(0) >p 2(iFB) then
U2(pL
2(®);0) >U 2(p2(0);0) = 0 and the second-period participation constraint following
no investment ceases to bind. This occurs at ® = a>^ ® in ¯gure 3.
In ¯gure 4 the deterministic social welfare is plotted with ®m = 1, the utilitarian case.
If the government inadvertently chooses a more pro-industry regulator, the regulated price
20Calculations are based on the deterministic case c1 = c2 = c and k1 = k2 = k where c and k are
constants. Functional forms and parameter values are: f(i)=i
° ;Ã
¡1(p)=Ap
¡´ ; A =2 ;°=0 :5;c=
k =1 ;´=1 :1;±=0 :95
5;b= d = 1. In our 2-period model, this choice of ± can be interpreted as an
annual 5% discount rate over a 5-year regulatory review period
21Figure 3: The Delegation Game: Price and Rent
rises and consumer surplus falls until at a another threshold ~ ®, for ®>~ ® delegation
becomes counterproductive. As with Rogo®-delegation to an independent central bank,
the optimal degree of pro-¯rm bias ® can be computed by maximizing the expected welfare
calculated over the distributions of c2 and k2. There are interesting issues here concerning
the relationship between the optimal type of regulator and the nature of the uncertainty
regarding costs captured by these distributions, but these are left to future research.
As with monetary policy, the great advantage of Rogo®-delegation is that it allows
full discretion for the regulator to engage in period-by-period optimization based on all
information available at the time the price decision is made. In the context of our model
a su±ciently pro-¯rm regulator will implement the Lerner price pL
2 based on the latest
estimate of c2. By contrast, the optimal rule with revisions to k2 may be indistinguishable
from reneging on the rule altogether. An alternative is the ¯xed version of the rule based
on estimates made in period 1. Certainly this makes the rule more transparent and the
regulator more accountable. But in the face of signi¯cant model uncertainty, the ¯xed



















Figure 4: The Delegation Game: Welfare=W(p)+U(p;i)
4.6 Procedures, Commitment and Discretion
As for the case of monetary policy, the choice of approach to the credibility problem in
utility regulation is between 1) Commitment to a ¯xed and therefore sub-optimal rule based
on information on the industry available at the time the rule is announced, or perhaps a
simple and therefore sub-optimal rule that is state-contingent but only in a very limited
and transparent way, and is based on common information, or 2) Rogo®-delegation to a
literally conservative regulator or, in our preferred interpretation, `as if' Rogo® delegation
to an independent regulator who has a duty to behave in a conservative way and follows
a sub-optimal discretionary policy based on the latest information on the industry.21 In
public utilitites regulation, it is common that the government establishes the policy to
be followed (for example, a policy to expand broadband, or a policy to promote certain
fuels in energy) and the regulator sets a previously de¯ned set of instruments using all
available current information. Primary legislation usually prescribes that the regulator
has to guarantee the ¯nancial viability of regulated ¯rms. In this sense, regulators such
21In the electricity industry, recent appraisals of actual regulatory reforms point out that regulatory
governance arrangements based on rigid rules were not robust to unforeseen contingencies. Joskow (2001)
for the case of California.
23as the British are goal-dependent and required to behave in a conservative way.
In the context of monetary policy the emphasis has been made on \well-understood
procedures within which judgements can be made and openly explained rather than re-
lying on decisions made behind closed doors".22 Increasingly, clear and open regulatory
procedures are seen as the essential foundation of fair and e®ective regulation by telecom
and other utility service regulatory agencies. The case for clear and open procedures of-
ten leads to the suggestion that regulatory agencies should operate by simple rules and
have no (or minimal) discretion. This view is particularly associated with Spiller (see for
example Guasch Spiller, 1999) and it is developed in a framework where the emphasis is
on the need for regulatory stability to achieve successful privatisation. Indeed critics of
UK regulatory processes regularly maintain that regulators have too much discretion.
In the context of Latin America and in many developing countries, Spiller rightly argues
that the essential is to create e®ective governance arrangements. These must be tailored
to the institutional capacity of the country and it is more important than the content of
regulation. Hence, it is argued that countries with limited institutional capacity should
carry out regulation by simple, minimum discretion or, if possible, by reliance by the
regulatory agency on contract enforcement. The problem is that the proposed solution
is very in°exible and seems to create signi¯cant problems beyond the short run as post-
privatisation con°icts in Chile and other Latin American countries have shown.23
In telecommunications regulation, whilst the non-independent and very much legally
constrained Subtel in Chile seems to follow the route of commitment to state contingent
rules, the more discretionary regulation by Oftel in the UK may be thought of as following
the route of `as if' Rogo® delegation. Again, it must be emphasised that `as if' Rogo®
delegation may co-exist with highly variable degrees of discretion. For example, in the
UK it can be argued that the BoE has much less discretion than Oftel. The latter is more
personalized than the former, and the government has less mechanisms to intervene in a
fully transparent way in telecommunications regulation than in monetary policy.
In reality, proper regulatory governance arrangements are crucial precisely because
telecom and other utility regulation cannot avoid some discretion. Indeed, regulatory sys-
22See Brown (2001).
23See Fischer and Galetovic (2000) on problems derived from rigidity in Chilean electricity and Abdala
(1999) on post-privatisation con°icts in Argentinian telecommunications.
24tems work better where independent regulatory agencies are given (limited) discretionary
powers, but which they must exercise in a fully accountable and open way, to achieve
political legitimacy and market credibility.
5 The Impact of Independent Regulation
Some recent empirical studies on the impact of regulation, competition and privatisation
in network industries provide a good starting point for a cross-country comparison of reg-
ulator independence. Wallsten (1999) shows for 30 African and Latin American countries
between 1984 and 1997 that competition and privatisation in telecommunications, when
combined with adequate regulation, have a positive e®ect on network penetration. Bor-
tolotti et al. (1998) show that `sound' regulation is positively associated with increased
privatisation revenues due to lower regulatory risk, using data for 38 countries between
1977 and 1997. Henisz and Zelner (2000), using International Telecommunications Union
data on 55 countries between 1975 and 1994 show that the probability of arbitrary change
in the policy environment negatively a®ects telecommunications investment.24 Interest-
ingly, Roller and Duso (2001) warn about the problem of not taking into account the
potential endogeneity of the regulatory and other policy variables, and suggest the use of
political variables as instruments to correct for this problem, which they show to cause
lack of consistency of the estimates.
Despite these e®orts, the testing of the impact of independent regulatory agencies
on telecom or other network industries' outcomes is in its infancy relative to the testing
of the impact of independent central banks. Moreover, the measurement of regulatory
arrangements in these studies in terms of indices has not been very satisfactory and has
been much cruder than in the studies of the impact of independent central banks on
in°ation and other macro-economic outcomes.
It has to be said that it is not easy to construct good tests of an independent reg-
ulatory agency analogous to the simple in°ation rate (or in°ation and growth) test for
an independent central bank. More investment in the industry is the most obvious - but
an e®ective regulatory system may increase the e±ciency and/or length of life of capital
24Other cross-country empirical studies of the impact of privatisation, liberalisation and regulatory
reform include Ros (1999), Alexander et al. (1996) and Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000).
25and reduce investment requirements. Reductions of prices to consumers may be a good
indicator in comparing US states but, for Indian or Russian states, increases in prices may
be more relevant as an indicator of regulatory success.
In general, the studies that have been done tend to demonstrate bene¯cial e®ects
of both independent regulation and of competition for national telecom markets. But,
much more needs to be done on the characterization of key governance characteristics.
Developing and transition economies may not absolutely need an independent regulatory
agency to generate some private investment in telecoms but it is still, though, likely that
having such an agency would reduce the cost of capital to the countries involved. By how
much, and depending on what governance characteristics, remains to be established.
For central banks, we saw earlier that there was a question of how far actual indepen-
dence corresponded to formal, legal independence, particularly in developing countries.
This has also been a major issue for telecom and utility regulation. Some authors (eg
Noll, 2000) argue that it is unreasonable to expect smaller and poorer developing coun-
tries to establish e®ective independent telecom and similar regulatory agencies. Indeed,
this view is one that has led to the push for relying solely on regulation by contract or
seeking for regulation by multi-national agencies. The problem is that it is just as di±cult
to ¯nd credible regulatory alternatives to an independent regulatory agency with some
discretion as it is to ¯nd credible alternatives to monetary policy control by an indepen-
dent central bank. The problem is similar in both cases but the solution is equally as
elusive.25
It is clear that both independent CBs and regulatory agencies can be di±cult to sustain
in many environments. Their institutional form and sustainability depend on constitu-
tional, political and legal issues as well as on economic factors. The non-economic factors
vary, often considerably, between countries. However, both for independent central banks
and for regulatory agencies, a proper legal governance framework is the necessary starting
point. But, the willingness to abide by the spirit of the framework, ie the acceptance
by all actors, (including Ministers and politicians) of the need to sustain the institutions
is the key to the e®ectiveness and sustainability of the regulatory compact whether for
monetary policy or utility services. How to achieve this in modern democracies is a critical
25A regulatory price formula for the ¯rst few years of post-privatisation, with no regulatory discretion
until the initial period is over, may be useful in some contexts.
26challenge for political economy (see for example Abadala, 1999, on the Argentinian case
in telecommunications). Others in the political economy literature have pointed out the
roles of the judiciary, of legal contracts, of the strength and impartiality of the civil service
and of informal behavioural norms (e.g. Spiller and Vogelsang, 1999).
Finally, we note that it is rare to ¯nd countries with independent telecom regulatory
agencies that do not also have independent CBs operating monetary policy. Further, the
independent central bank usually preceded the independent regulatory agency, often by
many years (for example, Germany). The UK is a rare exception - Oftel was established
in 1984 but the Bank of England only received the responsibility for operating monetary
policy in 1997.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have set out the similarity in the nature of the underlying problems that
lead to the establishment of (a) independent central banks to operate national monetary
policies and (b) independent regulatory agencies for telecommunications and other utility
services. In both cases, the solutions result from the di±culties that governments face
in credibly establishing a reputation for sound long-run behaviour and resisting short-run
political pressures while preserving signi¯cant discretion in decisions. We have argued
that there are two broad solutions: ¯rst, limit the discretion of the bank or agency and
impose simple commitment rules that are either ¯xed, or are state-contingent but only in
a very limited and transparent way; second, Rogo® delegate either literally to conservative
agents, or in the `as if' sense, delegating to a goal-dependent institution that has a legal
duty to behave in a conservative way, allowing them full discretion to set instruments
using all available current information.26
But with both arrangements, to achieve the necessary credibility, it is essential that
governance of the institutions - central banks and regulatory agencies - support the frame-
work and provide the necessary reassurance that future governments will not be tempted
to renege on the commitment. In both cases, this is necessary given the link to long-run
26La®ont (2000) argues that limiting the discretion of the regulator reduces the rents that the ¯rm may
use to capture the regulatory process. Cowan et al (2000) argues that discretion may be preferred to rules
for the public to learn about the policy-maker's type.
27investments. The consequence is, for both sets of institutions, an emphasis on powers
and duties being established in a primary law that lays down the length of terms of o±ce,
appointment and dismissal criteria of institution directors, funding arrangements, etc. For
both central banks and regulatory agencies, what is required is institutions that provide
limited and accountable discretion within a clear policy framework. Although we leave the
formal developments on this for future work, we conjecture that accountability and trans-
parency27 in a context of limited discretion, are key to address the issues of asymmetric
information and capture in policy-making.
Of course, there are signi¯cant di®erences between the tasks faced by independent
central banks and independent regulatory agencies. The most important is that regulation
(at least in some network industries such as telecommunications) is inherently about the
monitoring and enforcement of the behaviour of commercial (and potentially competing)
companies according to licence conditions or equivalent obligations. Monetary policy is
not primarily concerned with the regulation of banks. In consequence, regulation must
operate within a general competition framework and may in time be replaced - at least in
some countries - by general ex post competition policy. A further crucial issue is that the
history of telecom and other utility service regulatory agencies is very limited, particularly
outside the US. In contrast, a signi¯cant number of countries still have very clear memories
of hyper-in°ation and the damage it causes. For many other countries there is a greater
understanding of the need to maintain a low in°ation rate through the relationship between
monetary stability, low in°ation and a good economic growth performance.
The empirical results uniformly show that independent central banks operating mon-
etary policy are associated with lower and less variable in°ation and that independent
central banks with better governance arrangements out-perform banks with less good
governance arrangements. However, whether the relationship is causal or related to un-
derlying policy choices is more debatable. These results are encouraging for the supporters
of independent regulatory agencies for telecoms and other utility service industries, but,
27There is a large literature on the costs and bene¯ts of transparency in the conduct of monetary
policy(see for example, Faust and Svensson (2001) and the survey by Geraats (2002), op. cit., which
broadly concludes in favour of transparency. The issue of optimal transparency has received less attention
in the area of regulation, but Grossman and Helpman (2001) argue that a better informed electorate
reduces the clout of pressure groups in policy making.
28as yet, the historical experience has not produced enough evidence to be able clearly to
demonstrate the gains from e®ective regulatory governance. Certainly, we can point to the
disasters that result from regulatory arrangements with poor governance, including the
bad outcomes arising from wide, non-accountable discretion, particularly in developing
countries (see Levy and Spiller, 1996).
The theoretical arguments and the central bank literature suggest strong potential
bene¯ts from well-founded regulatory arrangements with proper and transparent proce-
dures that will support limited and accountable discretion. The next task is to de¯ne and
estimate the bene¯ts, in practice, in the ¯eld of utility regulation.
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